Abstract. In this paper we study generalizations of the Diffie-Hellman problems recently used to construct cryptographic schemes for practical purposes. The Group Computational and the Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions not only enable one to construct efficient pseudo-random functions but also to naturally extend the DiffieHellman protocol to allow more than two parties to agree on a secret key. In this paper we provide results that add to our confidence in the GCDH problem. We reach this aim by showing exact relations among the GCDH, GDDH, CDH and DDH problems.
Introduction
The theoretical concepts of public-key cryptography go back to Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [11] whereas the first public-key cryptosystem appeared only two years later to Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [14] . In their seminal paper New Directions in Cryptography, Diffie and Hellman provided a method whereby two principals communicating over an insecure network can agree on a secret key: a key that a (computationally bounded) adversary cannot recover by only eavesdropping on the flows exchanged between the two principals.
Given a prime order cyclic group G and a generator g, the Diffie-Hellman protocol works as follows. Two principals U 1 , U 2 first pick at random x 1 , x 2 ∈ [1, |G|] and exchange the values g x 1 , g x 2 over the network. Principal U 1 (U 2 resp.) then computes the Diffie-Hellman secret g x 1 x 2 upon receiving the flow from principal U 2 (U 1 resp.). The motivation for running this protocol is to use the DiffieHellman secret as input of key derivation function mapping elements of the cyclic group to the space of either a MAC and/or a symmetric cipher.
The security of Diffie-Hellman schemes has thus far been based on two intractability assumptions. Schemes analyzed in the random-oracle model [4] generally rely on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH-assumption) which states that given the two values g x 1 and g x 2 a computationally bounded adversary cannot recover the Diffie-Hellman secret g x 1 x 2 [2, 3] . Strong security for schemes analyzed in the standard model usually relies on a stronger assumption than the CDH one [3, 15] , the so-called Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH-assumption). It states that given g x 1 and g x 2 a computationally bounded adversary cannot distinguish the Diffie-Hellman secret g x 1 x 2 from a random element g r in the group. This latter assumption is also useful to prove the security of ElGamal-based encryption schemes [12, 10] .
With the advance of multicast communication the Diffie-Hellman method has been extended to allow more than two principals to agree on a secret key [17] . In the case of three parties, for example, each principal picks at random a value x i ∈ [1, |G|] and they exchange the set of values g x i , g x i x j , for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, to compute the common group Diffie-Hellman secret g x 1 x 2 x 3 . The security of group Diffie-Hellman schemes has thus far been based on generalizations of the Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Schemes analyzed in the randomoracle model [4] have been proved secure under the Group Computational DiffieHellman assumption (GCDH-assumption) which states that given the values g Q x i , for some choice of proper subsets of {1, . . . , n}, a computationally bounded adversary cannot recover the group Diffie-Hellman secret [6, 7, 9] . This assumption has also found application in the context of pseudo-random functions [13] . Schemes for group Diffie-Hellman key exchange analyzed without the randomoracle model achieve strong security guarantees under the Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (GDDH-assumption) which states that given the values g Q x i the adversary cannot distinguish the group Diffie-Hellman secret from a random element in the group [8] .
Motivated by the increasing applications of the group Diffie-Hellman assumptions to cryptography we have studied their validity. Although we cannot prove the equivalence between the CDH and the GCDH in this paper, we are able to show that the GCDH can be considered to be a standard assumption. We reach this aim by relating the GCDH to both the CDH-assumption and the DDHassumption. The GCDH was furthermore believed to be a weaker assumption than the GDDH but it was not proved until now. In this paper we prove this statement by comparing the quality of the reduction we obtain for the GCDH and the one we carry out to relate the GDDH to the DDH. The results we obtain in this paper add to our confidence in the GCDH-assumption. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the related work. In Section 3 we formally define the group Diffie-Hellman assumptions. In Section 4 we show the relationship between the GDDH and the DDH. In Section 5 we carry out a similar treatment to relate the GCDH to both the CDH and DDH.
Related Work
The Generalized GDDH-assumption, defined in terms of the values g Q x i formed from all the proper subsets of {1, . . . , n}, first appeared in the literature in the paper by Steiner et al. [17] . They exhibited an asymptotic reduction to show that the DDH-assumption implies the Generalized GDDH-assumption. In his PhD thesis [16] , Steiner later quantified this reduction and showed that relating the Generalized GDDH problem to the DDH problem leads to very inefficient reductions, especially because a Generalized GDDH instance is exponentially large. He also pointed out as a research direction to study these reductions when the GDDH instance is not Generalized.
In practice, it is fortunately possible to improve on the quality of the reductions since only some of the proper subsets of indices are used in the key exchange protocol flows. These are special forms of the Generalized GDDH or even the Generalized GCDH. To prove secure protocols for static group Diffie-Hellman key exchange [6, 9] , we used the special structure of basic trigon (see Figure 1 ).
To prove secure protocols for dynamic group Diffie-Hellman key exchange [7, 8] , we used the special structure of extended basic trigon (see Figure 2) .
The first attempts to relate the Generalized GCDH to the CDH is due to Biham et al. [1] . Their results gave some confidence in the Generalized GCDH in the multiplicative group Z * n (where n is composite) by relating it to factoring, but our group DH key exchange schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] use large groups of known prime order so that the proofs can benefit from the multiplicative random self-reducibility (see below). Therefore in this paper we focus on this latter case only.
Complexity Assumptions
This section presents the group Diffie-Hellman assumptions by first introducing the notion of group Diffie-Hellman distribution and using it to define the group computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (GCDH-assumption) and the group decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (GDDH-assumption). For the remainder of the paper we fix a cyclic group G = g of prime order q.
Group Diffie-Hellman Distribution
The group Diffie-Hellman distribution (GDH-distribution) of size an integer n is the set of elements g Q j∈J x j for some proper subsets J I n = {1, .., n}. We formally write it using the set P(I n ) of all subsets of I n and any subset Γ n of P(I n )\{I n }, as follows:
Since this distribution is a function of the parameters n and Γ n it could be instantiated with any of the following special forms:
-If n = 2 and Γ 2 = {{1}, {2}}, the GDH-distribution is the usual DiffieHellman distribution. -If Γ n has the following triangular structure T n , the GDH-distribution is the basic trigon depicted in Figure 1 :
-If Γ n has the following structure E n , the GDH-distribution is the extended trigon depicted in Figure 2 : -If Γ n = P(I n )\{I n }, the GDH-distribution is the Generalized GDH-distribution since we have all the proper subsets of {1, . . . , n}.
The γ function denotes the cardinality of any structure Γ :
since the i-th "line" of this structure has exactly i elements.
-And the cardinality of E n is ε n = γ(E n ) = γ(T n ) + n−2 n − n + 1 = n 2 − n + 1 since the extension of the n − 1-th line of this structure has exactly n−2 n − (n − 1) elements.
-It is also worthwhile to mention that the cardinality of the Generalized one is 2 n − 2.
The later is exponential in n, while the two others are quadratic.
Good Structure Families
For any indexed structure Γ = {Γ n }, we consider an auxiliary structureΓ = {Γ n }, whereΓ n is built from the set {0, 3, . . . , n + 1} in the same way Γ n is built from the set I n through the map 1 → 0, 2 → 3, . . . , n → n + 1.
Definition 1 (Good Structure Family).
A family Γ = {Γ n } is good if for any integer n greater than 3 the following four conditions are satisfied:
where for any J, we denote by J 1 , J 2 and J 12 the sets J\{1}, J\{2} and J\{1, 2} respectively.
In other words, this means that
where for any J, we denote by J 0 the set J\{0}.
Note 2. The basic trigon T = {T n } and extended trigon E = {E n } are good structure families.
Group Diffie-Hellman Assumptions
Definition 3 (The Group Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption). A (T, ε)-GCDH Γn -attacker in G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆ running in time T such that
The GCDH Γn -problem is (T, ε)-intractable if there is no (T, ε)-GCDH Γn -attacker in G. The GCDH Γ -assumption states this is the case for all polynomial T and non-negligible ε, for a family Γ = {Γ n }.
Let us define two additional distributions from the GDH-distribution:
A GDDH Γn -distinguisher in G is a probabilistic Turing machine trying to distinguish GDH Γn from GDH $ Γn .
Definition 4 (The Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption). A (T, ε)-GDDH Γn -distinguisher in G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆ running in time T such that its advantage Adv
is greater than ε.
The GDDH Γn -problem is (T, ε)-intractable if there is no (T, ε)-GDDH Γn -distinguisher in G. The GDDH Γ -assumption states this is the case for all polynomial T and non-negligible ε, for a family Γ = {Γ n }.
The Random Self-Reducibility
The Diffie-Hellman problems have the nice property of random self-reducibility. Certainly the most common is the additive random self-reducibility, which works as follows. Given, for example, a GCDH-instance D = (g a , g b , g c , g ab , g bc , g ac ) for any a, b, c it is possible to generate a random instance
where α, β and γ are random numbers in Z q , whose solution may help us to solve D. Indeed, given the solution z = g (a+α).(b+β).(c+γ) to the instance D it is possible to recover the solution g abc to the random instance D (i.e.
. However the cost of such a computation may be high; furthermore it is easily seen that such a reduction works for the Generalized DH-distribution only and thus its cost increases exponentially with the size of D.
On the other hand, the multiplicative random self-reducibility works for any form of the GDH-problems in a prime order cyclic group. Given, for example, a GCDH-instance D = (g a , g b , g ab , g ac ) for any a, b, c it is easy to generate a random instance D = (g aα , g bβ , g abαβ , g acαγ ) where α, β and γ are random numbers in Z * q . And given the solution K to the instance D , we directly get the solution K = K δ , where δ = (αβγ) −1 mod q, to the instance D. Such a reduction is efficient and only requires a linear number of modular exponentiations.
The Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem
In this section we provide a reduction of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem to the group Decisional Diffie-Hellman (GDDH) problem, but for the good structure families only.
The Main Result
Theorem 5. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q and t G the time needed for an exponentiation in G. For any integer n and any good structure family Γ = {Γ n } of cardinality γ = {γ n }, we have:
The proof of this theorem results, by induction, from the following two lemmas 6 and 7 which lead to
However before to prove it let's plug in some numerical values for the time of computation:
-for the structure of basic trigon T n , the time t is less than t + n 3 t G /3;
-for the structure of extended trigon E n , the time t is less than t + 2n 3 t G /3.
For proving this result, we need to alter Group Diffie-Hellman tuples, introducing some randomness. This leads to the group random distributions (the group random adversaries resp.) where some elements are independently random in the group Diffie-Hellman distributions (the group Diffie-Hellman problems resp.).
Group Random Distributions
Let us split in two parts instances D Γn (x 1 , . . . , x n ):
We can now define an additional distribution:
where
Similarly to above, we define V Γn (x 1 , . . . , x n , α) and V $ Γn (x 1 , . . . , x n , α, r), the extensions of V Γn (x 1 , . . . , x n , α) where one appends {(I n , g αx 3 ···xn )} and {(I n , g r )} respectively. Then,
We note that under the constraint α = x 1 x 2 , for any x 1 , . . . , x n , r ∈ R Z q , one has,
Group Random Adversaries
A (T, ε)-GCR Γn -attacker in G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆ running in time T such that
A (T, ε)-GDR Γn -distinguisher in G is a probabilistic Turing machine ∆ running in time T such that its advantage Adv
Proof
Lemma 6. For any integer n and any structure Γ n , we have
Proof. We consider an adversary A against the GDDH Γn problem. Such an adversary, on input a distribution depending on a bit b, replies with a bit b which is a guess for b. We assume that A runs in maximal time t, in particular it always terminates, even if the input comes from neither GDH Γn nor from GDH $ Γn . Then we define the following two games: G 0 , G 1 and consider the event S i in game
Game G 0 . In this game, we are given a Diffie-Hellman triple (A, B, C) = (g x 1 , g x 2 , g x 1 x 2 ). Then we choose at random (x 3 , . . . , x n ) in Z * q and compute a tuple U n which follows the distribution GDH Γn , as follows
Then if b = 1, one appends to U n the value C x 3 ···xn ; and if b = 0, one appends to U n a value g r , where r is a random exponent: the computed tuple follows exactly the distribution GDH Γn (resp. GDH Game G 1 . Game G 1 is the same as game G 0 except that we are given a tuple (A, B, C) = (g
where α is a random exponent. It is easy to see that the tuple given to the attacker A follows the distribution GR Γn (resp. GR
Also, the difference in the probability distributions in the two games is upperbounded by:
Lemma 7. For any good structure family Γ = {Γ n } and any integer n, we have
Proof. We consider a GDR Γn -distinguisher A running in time t and we use it to built a GDDH Γ n−1 -distinguisher. To reach that goal, we receive as input a tuple drawn from either GDH Γ n−1 or GDH
. We use A to guess the underlying bit b. In the given tuple, we denote by (I n−1 , u n−1 ) the last value and by U n−1 the first values of this input tuple:
We split the tuple U n−1 in two blocks, depending whether 1 ∈ J:
Now we write this tuple by renaming the variables x 1 , . . . , x n−1 to be respectively X 0 , X 3 , . . . , X n . It then follows that the elements of U n−1 are indexed by the elements ofΓ n−1 rather than Γ n−1 :
Now we pick at random two values X 1 , X 2 in Z * q and use them to construct the following tuple, in which the last block in the above equation is split in the last three blocks of W n−1 :
Remember that Γ is a "good" structure family:
Then one can build the following tuple V n which is also included in W n−1 :
We note that
Then V n is appended (I n , u n−1 ) and given to A. The latter returns a bit b that we relay back as an answer to the original GDDH Γ n−1 problem. The computation time needed to properly generate V n from the input U n−1 is at most γ n t G . Thus, we have
Putting all together, we obtain: 
The Group Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
In this section we show the GCDH is a standard assumption by relating it to both the CDH and the DDH.
Theorem 8. Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order q and t G the time needed for an exponentiation in G. Then for any integer n and any good structure family Γ = {Γ n } of cardinality γ = {γ n } we have: As for the previous theorem, the result comes, by induction, from both Proof. We consider an adversary A against the GCDH Γn problem. Such an adversary, on input a tuple drawn from the GDH Γn distribution, replies with a single value which is a guess for the corresponding secret. We assume that A runs in maximal time t, in particular it always terminates, even if the input does not come from GDH Γn .
We then define a sequence of games G 0 , G 1 , . . . . In each game, given a triple (A, B, C) and n − 2 random elements (x 3 , . . . , x n ) in Z * q (which are not necessarily known), we consider S i as the event that the adversary A outputs C x 3 ···xn .
Game G 0 . In this game, we are given a Diffie-Hellman triple (A, B, C) = (g x 1 , g x 2 , g x 1 x 2 ). Then by randomly choosing (x 3 , . . . , x n ) we can compute:
Since it is true for any adversary running within time t,
